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THE SITUATION IN PENNSYLVANIA
The way of the reformer, li~e that of the transgressor, is hard. It. will
be recalled that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, after an excellent start in
1925 in the application of the procedure for a declarat~ry judgment in Kari-
hey's Petition,! had fallen into regrettable error in a number ·of later cases 2
by assuming that a declaratory judgment could· not be sought or granted
when any other "established" remedy was available. This was in direct con-
flict with the express words of the Declaratory Judgments Act 8 'to the effect
that declaratory judgments may be rendered "whether or not further relief
is or could be claimed", i. e.; whether further or coercive relief (I) is also
claimed; (2) is not but could be claimed; or (3) is not and could not be
claimed. Clearly possibilities (I) and (2) indicate that declaratory relief
may be demanded cumulatively or in the alternative notwithstanding the
fact that a common law or equitable remedy is ~lso or might instead have
been sought. In most of the Pennsylvania cases this was recognized, for
in the vast majority of Pennsylvania cases some other remedy was avail-
able,· but the petitioner preferred and received a declaration of rights, which
was appropriate and adequate relief. Yet the lack of judicial uniformity
in the matter left the outcome of any particular litigation uncertain, for
the objecting party would necessarily undertake to plead that another rem-
edy was available, and the final position of the court in a particular case
seemed unpredictable. Lawyers dislike judicial caprice, so that the doubt
militated against widespread use. of the declaratory judgment in Pennsyl-
vania.
t Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale Uni:versity Law School.
I. 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925). .
2. In re Cryan's Estate, 301 Pa. '386, 152 Atl. 675 (1930); Nesbitt v. Manufacturer's
Casualty Insurance Co., 310 Pa.374, 165 'AU. 403 (1933); Bell Telephone Co. of Penna. v.
Lewis, 313 Pa. 374, 169 ,AU. 571 (1934),82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 544. .
3. Act of June 18, 1923, P. L. 840, § I, I:l P. S. § 831.
40 BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 151; Borchard, Declaratory Judgment ..
in Pennsylwnia (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 317, 322.
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The courts had slipped into the error mentioned by misquoting what
Chief Justice von Moschzisker, speaking with long historical authority, had
stated in Kariher's Petition. Outlining the functions of the Act he had re-
marked 'that a declaratory judgment would ncit be entertained "where an-
other statutory remedy has been specifically provided for the character of
case in hand". This was in accordance with the best practice in England
and the United States, for it.was never intended that a declaratory judgment
should be sought where the statute had:provided a specific form .of proceed-
ing for a special type of case, like tax assessment, eminent domain, divorce,
annulment of marriage, or other clearly defined type of issue. But in 1928,'
in Leafgreen v. La Bar,6 the clear statement of Judge von Moschzisker was
unintentionally distorted and he was charged with having said that a declar-
atory judgment would not lie where another "equaIly serviceable" remedy
was available. This of course was something quite different i but by 1933
the phrase had been further transformed into a ground for dismissal where
the question U can be litigated in the established course of legal.and equi-
table procedure".8 This was a far cry from the rigidly correct position of
1925 and not only departed from the terms of Section 1 of the Act and its
usUal construction, even in Pennsylvania, but if persisted in, would reduce
the declaratory judgment to an extraordinary or exceptional remedy not,
invokable where another remedy was available.T
To correct this error and bring the Act back to its original meaning
and purpose, Judge von Moschzisker, after retirement from the bench,
drafted an amendment to' Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Declaratory Judg-
ments Act, which permitted the court to refuse' a declaratory judgment where
it uwould not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the
.proceeding", by expressing the rule above mentioned in precise detail. His
amendment, which omitted the italicized appendix, read as follows: 8
"Relief by declaratory judgment or decree may be granted in aU
civil cases where an actual controversy exists between contending par-
ties, or 'where the court is satisfied that antagonistic claims are present
between the parties involved which indicate imminent and inevitable
litigation, or where in any such case the court is satisfied that "a party
asserts a legal relation, status, right, or privilege in which he has a con-
crete interest and that there is a challenge or denial of such asserted
S. 293 Pa. 263. 142 Atl. 224 (1928).
6. Nesbitt v. Manufacture.r's Casualty Ins. Co., 310 Pa. 374, 380, 165 At!. 403, 405 (1933).
In Bell Telephone Co. v. LeWIS, 313 Pa. 374, 169 AU. 571 (1934), the phrase used was "ade-
quate .remedy". But while correctly quoting Judge von Moschzisker's language concerning
"another statutory remedy", the court erroneously conclu.ded that mandamus is such a special
statutory remedy. .
.7. It is. of course proper not to gr!'nt ~ declar~tory judgment where a'pending case will
decide the Issue completely, or where It Will not give complete or adequate relief or where
it is premature. See Pennsylvania cases cited in BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934)
lSI, 179-
8. Amen~.ent of April 2S. 1935. P. L. 72, § I, 12 P. S. § 836 (Supp. 1935).
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